Should a team be homogeneous?
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- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
- Arrow, K J & Radner, R, 1979. "Allocation of Resources in Large Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 361-85, March.
- Prat, Andrea, 1996. "Shared Knowledge vs Diversified Knowledge in Teams," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 181-195, June.
- Groves, Theodore & Radner, Roy, 1972. "Allocation of resources in a team," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 415-441, June.
- Margaret A. Meyer & Dilip Mookherjee, 1987. "Incentives, Compensation, and Social Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 209-226.
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