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Stratification and Growth in Agent-based Matching Markets

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  • James W. Boudreau

    (University of Connecticut
    University of Connecticut)

Abstract

This paper examines the dynamic impact of matching on economic mobility and growth. To account for complex interactions over time, experimental economies of heterogeneous agents are simulated with the match process acting as a fitness selection mechanism. Even with perfect information and substantial variety in both offspring and entrants, two-sided matching inevitably causes the population to evolve into stratified groups. Corrective measures are possible to improve mobility, but by altering the path of market evolution, a policy may have unintended negative impacts on growth and inequality.

Suggested Citation

  • James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Stratification and Growth in Agent-based Matching Markets," Working papers 2008-30, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2008-30
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Neugart & Matteo G. Richiardi, 2012. "Agent-based models of the labor market," LABORatorio R. Revelli Working Papers Series 125, LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies.
    2. Cardullo, Gabriele & Guerci, Eric, 2019. "Interpreting the Beveridge curve. An agent-based approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 84-100.
    3. Furtado, Bernardo Alves & Eberhardt, Isaque Daniel Rocha, 2015. "Modelo espacial simples da economia: uma proposta teórico-metodológica [A simple spatial economic model: a proposal]," MPRA Paper 67005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Caner Ates & Dietmar Maringer, 2021. "A Parsimonious Macroeconomic ABM for Labor Market Regulations," LEM Papers Series 2021/46, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    5. Jung-Seung Yang, 2022. "Dynamics of Firm’s Investment in Education and Training: An Agent-based Approach," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 60(4), pages 1317-1351, December.
    6. Bernardo Alves Furtado & Isaque Daniel Rocha Eberhardt, 2016. "A Simple Agent-Based Spatial Model of the Economy: Tools for Policy," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 19(4), pages 1-12.
    7. André Veski & Kaire Põder, 2018. "Zero-intelligence agents looking for a job," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 13(3), pages 615-640, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; stratification; path dependence.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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