Equilibrium selection and the role of information in repeated matching markets
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1997. "Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 284-329, April.
- Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-1480, November.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- repec:kap:expeco:v:20:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10683-016-9505-0 is not listed on IDEAS
- Philipp Otto & Friedel Bolle, 2011. "Matching markets with price bargaining," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 322-348, September.
- Boudreau, James W., 2010.
"Stratification and growth in agent-based matching markets,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 168-179, August.
- James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Stratification and Growth in Agent-based Matching Markets," Working papers 2008-30, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Drouvelis, Michalis & Müller, Wieland & Possajennikov, Alex, 2012. "Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 102-119.
- David Hugh-Jones & David Reinstein, 2010. "Losing Face," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-068, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz, 2016.
"Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment,"
926, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Joana Pais & Flip Klijn & Marc Vorsatz, 2017. "Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers REM 2017/04, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
- repec:pit:wpaper:487 is not listed on IDEAS
- Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2013.
"Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation,"
MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(2), pages 1-40, June.
- Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2008. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 718, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation," NBER Working Papers 15006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Guillen, Pablo & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2014. "Monkey see, monkey do: Truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2014-202, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- repec:esx:essedp:769 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:syd:wpaper:2123/9951 is not listed on IDEAS
- Joana Pais & Ágnes Pintér & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2017. "Decentralized Matching Markets With(out) Frictions: A Laboratory Experiment," Working Papers REM 2017/03, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:94:y:2007:i:2:p:284-289. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.