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An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching

Author

Listed:
  • Federico Echenique
  • Alejandro Robinson-Cort'es
  • Leeat Yariv

Abstract

We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary non-binding match offers that get finalized when a period of market inactivity has elapsed. Several insights emerge. First, stable outcomes are prevalent. Second, while centralized clearinghouses commonly aim at implementing extremal stable matchings, our decentralized markets most frequently culminate in the median stable matching. Third, preferences' cardinal representations impact the stable partners participants match with. Last, the dynamics underlying our results exhibit strategic sophistication, with agents successfully avoiding cycles of blocking pairs.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Echenique & Alejandro Robinson-Cort'es & Leeat Yariv, 2024. "An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching," Papers 2401.10872, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2401.10872
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    Cited by:

    1. Yariv, Leeat & Agranov, Marina & Dianat, Ahrash & Samuelson, Larry, 2021. "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 15637, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Eric Budish & Judd B. Kessler, 2022. "Can Market Participants Report Their Preferences Accurately (Enough)?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1107-1130, February.
    3. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2022. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 18-33, March.
    4. Gutin, Gregory Z. & Neary, Philip R. & Yeo, Anders, 2024. "Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 244-263.
    5. Marina Agranov & Ahrash Dianat & Larry Samuelson & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," Working Papers 2021-74, Princeton University. Economics Department..

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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