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Why Dowries?

Author

Listed:
  • Maristella Botticini
  • Aloysius Siow

Abstract

When married daughters leave their parental home and their married brothers do not, altruistic parents provide dowries for daughters and bequests for sons in order to solve a free riding problem between their married sons and daughters. The theory has predictions on the form of the dowry contract, the effect of family demographics on the value of the dowry, and the decline of dowries in previously dowry giving societies. The theory is consistent with cross-section dowry data from medieval Italy. It is also consistent with the factors that eld to the decline of dowries in Sao Paulo, Brazil.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Maristella Botticini & Aloysius Siow, 2003. "Why Dowries?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1385-1398, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:4:p:1385-1398
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282803769206368
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Botticini, Maristella, 1999. "A Loveless Economy? Intergenerational Altruism and the Marriage Market in a Tuscan Town, 1415–1436," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 104-121, March.
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