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Marital transfer and intra-household allocation: a Nash-bargaining analysis

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  • Suen, Wing
  • Chan, William
  • Zhang, Junsen

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  • Suen, Wing & Chan, William & Zhang, Junsen, 2003. "Marital transfer and intra-household allocation: a Nash-bargaining analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 133-146, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:52:y:2003:i:1:p:133-146
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    1. Botticini, Maristella, 1999. "A Loveless Economy? Intergenerational Altruism and the Marriage Market in a Tuscan Town, 1415–1436," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(01), pages 104-121, March.
    2. Rao, Vijayendra, 1993. "The Rising Price of Husbands: A Hedonic Analysis of Dowry Increases in Rural India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 666-677, August.
    3. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1.
    5. Maristella Botticini & Aloysius Siow, 2003. "Why Dowries?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1385-1398, September.
    6. Nerlove, Marc & Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 1984. "Bequests and the Size of Population When Population Is Endogenous," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(3), pages 527-531, June.
    7. Becker, Gary S & Landes, Elisabeth M & Michael, Robert T, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1141-1187, December.
    8. Zhang, Junsen, 1994. "Bequest as a Public Good within Marriage: A Note," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(1), pages 187-193, February.
    9. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-467, June.
    10. David Lam, 1988. "Marriage Markets and Assortative Mating with Household Public Goods: Theoretical Results and Empirical Implications," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 23(4), pages 462-487.
    11. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Cornes, Richard C, 1983. "Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1753-1765, November.
    12. Weiss, Yoram & Willis, Robert J, 1985. "Children as Collective Goods and Divorce Settlements," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(3), pages 268-292, July.
    13. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    14. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andaluz, Joaquín & Marcén, Miriam & Molina, José Alberto, 2007. "Income Transfers, Welfare and Family Decisions," IZA Discussion Papers 2804, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Rosa Aisa & Joaquín Andaluz & Gemma Larramona, 2017. "Fertility patterns in the Roma population of Spain," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 115-133, March.
    3. Aísa, R. & Andaluz, J. & Larramona, G., 2011. "How does bargaining power affect remittances?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 47-54.
    4. YOUM Yoosik, 2011. "A Network Approach to the Economic Models of Fertility," Discussion papers 11062, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    5. Raúl Ramos & Esteban Sanromá & Hipólito Simón, 2014. "Public-Private Sector Wage Differentials by Type of Contract: Evidence from Spain," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 208(1), pages 107-141, March.
    6. Huang, Fali & Jin, Ginger Zhe & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2017. "Love, money, and parental goods: Does parental matchmaking matter?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 224-245.
    7. Srinivasan, Sharada & Bedi, Arjun S., 2007. "Domestic Violence and Dowry: Evidence from a South Indian Village," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 857-880, May.
    8. Kati Schindler, 2010. "Credit for What? Informal Credit as a Coping Strategy of Market Women in Northern Ghana," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(2), pages 234-253.
    9. repec:bla:manchs:v:85:y:2017:i:3:p:320-338 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Huang, Fali & Jin, Ginger Zhe & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2015. "Love, money, and old age support : does parental matchmaking matter ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7188, The World Bank.
    11. Baomin Dong & Tianpeng Zhou, 2013. "A Moral Hazard Model of Parental Care," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 207(4), pages 101-115, December.
    12. Bhattacharyya, Manasi & Bedi, Arjun S. & Chhachhi, Amrita, 2011. "Marital Violence and Women's Employment and Property Status: Evidence from North Indian Villages," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1676-1689, September.
    13. Nazia Mansoor, 2011. "Marriage payments and bargaining power of women in rural Bangladesh," Studies in Economics 1119, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    14. Andaluz, Joaquin & Molina, Jose Alberto, 2007. "How do altruistic parental transfers affect the welfare gains of marriage?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-9, March.

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