Bequest as a Public Good within Marriage: A Note
Bequest to and marriage of children can lead to a Pareto-inefficient allocation. The inefficiency (or market failure) arises because one family, making a bequest to its own child, ignores the contribution to the utility of the other family whose child enters the marriage. This note shows that an assortative mating rule based on bequests can improve or even restore Pareto efficiency when parents take account of the rule in deciding the amount of bequests to their own children. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.
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