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Income Transfers, Welfare and Family Decisions

Listed author(s):
  • Andaluz, Joaquín

    ()

    (University of Zaragoza)

  • Marcén, Miriam

    ()

    (University of Zaragoza)

  • Molina, José Alberto

    ()

    (University of Zaragoza)

This paper studies the effects of different income transfers on individual welfare, in both marriage and divorce situations, and on family decisions. We assume three generations within the family. We develop a sequential game that, in a first stage, determines the optimum level of the transfer within a relationship of one-sided altruism. In the second stage, the level of welfare is deduced by way of a Nash bargaining solution. We show that inter-generational transfers may produce losses derived from the marriage. We have also found that the donor of an intergenerational transfer can behave in a compensatory way in an altruism model.

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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2804.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: May 2007
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2804
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  14. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
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  16. Luigi Guiso & Tullio Jappelli, 1999. "Private Transfers, Borrowing Constraints and the Timing of Homeownership," CSEF Working Papers 17, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  17. Ben-Porath, Yoram, 1973. "Economic Analysis of Fertility in Israel: Point and Counterpoint," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 202-233, Part II, .
  18. Donald Cox & Zekeriya Eser & Emmanuel Jimenez, 1996. "Motives for Private Transfers over the Life Cycle: An Analytical Framework and Evidence for Peru," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 327., Boston College Department of Economics.
  19. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
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  22. Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 151-182, July.
  23. Andaluz, Joaquin & Molina, Jose Alberto, 2007. "How do altruistic parental transfers affect the welfare gains of marriage?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-9, March.
  24. Becker, Gary S, 1981. "Altruism in the Family and Selfishness in the Market Place," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 48(189), pages 1-15, February.
  25. Arrondel, Luc & Masson, Andre, 2001. " Family Transfers Involving Three Generations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(3), pages 415-443, September.
  26. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
  27. Chami, Ralph, 1998. "Private Income Transfers and Market Incentives," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(260), pages 557-580, November.
  28. Reuben Gronau, 1974. "The Effect of Children on the Housewife's Value of Time," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, and Human Capital, pages 457-490 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  30. Arrondel, Luc & Laferrere, Anne, 2001. "Taxation and wealth transmission in France," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 3-33, January.
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  32. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
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