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Allocating Time: Individuals' Technologies, Household Technology, Perfect Substitutes, and Specialization

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  • Robert A. Pollak

Abstract

In an efficient household if the spouses' time inputs are perfect substitutes, then spouses will "specialize" regardless of their preferences and the governance structure. That is, both spouses will not allocate time to both household production and the market sector. The perfect substitutes assumption implies that spouses' "unilateral" production functions (i.e., the household production function when only one spouse allocates time to home production) are closely related, satisfying a highly restrictive condition that I call "compatibility." I introduce the "correspondence assumption," which postulates that the unilateral production functions in a newly formed household coincide with individuals' production functions before they enter marriage. The correspondence assumption provides a plausible account of the genesis of household technology and simplifies its estimation. I introduce the "additivity assumption" which postulates that the household production function is the sum of the spouses' unilateral production functions and argue that additivity is implicit in much of the new home economics. Together, the correspondence and additivity assumptions imply that individuals' technologies reveal the entire household technology. I show that perfect substitutes, additivity and concavity imply that the household production function is of the same form as the unilateral production functions, exhibits constant returns to scale, and depends on the spouses' total time inputs, measured in efficiency units.

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  • Robert A. Pollak, 2011. "Allocating Time: Individuals' Technologies, Household Technology, Perfect Substitutes, and Specialization," NBER Working Papers 17529, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17529
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    1. Guiso, Luigi & Zaccaria, Luana, 2023. "From patriarchy to partnership: Gender equality and household finance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 573-595.
    2. Xianwen Shi & Ronald Wolthoff & Aloysius Siow & Robert McCann, 2012. "Becker meets Ricardo: A social and cognitive skills model of human capabilities," 2012 Meeting Papers 32, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Sunha Myong & JungJae Park & Junjian Yi, 2021. "Social Norms and Fertility," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(5), pages 2429-2466.
    4. Cristina BorraBy & Martin Browning & Almudena Sevilla, 2021. "Marriage and housework [Measuring trends in leisure: the allocation of time over five decades]," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(2), pages 479-508.
    5. Leslie S. Stratton, 2012. "The Role of Preferences and Opportunity Costs in Determining the Time Allocated to Housework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 606-611, May.
    6. Antonella Caiumi & Federico Perali, 2015. "Who bears the full cost of children? Evidence from a collective demand system," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, August.
    7. Ran Gu & Cameron Peng & Weilong Zhang, 2021. "The gender gap in household bargaining power: a portfolio-choice approach," IFS Working Papers W21/11, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    8. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert, 2013. "Cohabitation and the Uneven Retreat from Marriage in the U.S., 1950-2010," IZA Discussion Papers 7607, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Jeanne Lafortune & Corinne Low, 2023. "Collateralized Marriage," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 252-291, October.
    10. Robert J. McCann & Xianwen Shi & Aloysius Siow & Ronald Wolthoff, 2012. "Becker Meets Ricardo: Multisector Matching with Social and Cognitive Skills," Working Papers tecipa-454, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    11. David Boto‐García & Federico Perali, 2024. "The association between marital locus of control and break‐up intentions," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 83(1), pages 35-57, January.
    12. Eleonora Matteazzi & Martina Menon & Federico Perali, 2017. "The Collective Farm-household Model: Policy and Welfare Simulations," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 39(1), pages 111-153.
    13. Liat Raz-Yurovich, 2014. "A Transaction Cost Approach to Outsourcing by Households," Population and Development Review, The Population Council, Inc., vol. 40(2), pages 293-309, June.
    14. Halldén, Karin & Stenberg, Anders, 2013. "The Relationship between Hours of Domestic Services and Female Earnings: Panel Register Data Evidence from a Reform," Working Paper Series 4/2013, Stockholm University, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
    15. Liat Raz-Yurovich, 2022. "Leisure: Definitions, Trends, and Policy Implications," Population Research and Policy Review, Springer;Southern Demographic Association (SDA), vol. 41(3), pages 981-1019, June.
    16. Robert A. Pollak, 2013. "Allocating Household Time: When Does Efficiency Imply Specialization?," NBER Working Papers 19178, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Jesper R.-V. Soerensen, 2020. "Testing a Class of Semi- or Nonparametric Conditional Moment Restriction Models using Series Methods," Discussion Papers 20-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    18. Tim Rathjen, 2011. "Do Time Poor Individuals Pay More?," FFB-Discussionpaper 91, Research Institute on Professions (Forschungsinstitut Freie Berufe (FFB)), LEUPHANA University Lüneburg.
    19. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 2014. "Cohabitation and the Uneven Retreat from Marriage in the United States, 1950–2010," NBER Chapters, in: Human Capital in History: The American Record, pages 241-272, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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