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The association between Marital Locus of Control and break-up intentions

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  • David Boto-Garc'ia
  • Federico Perali

Abstract

Understanding couple instability is a topic of social and economic relevance. This paper investigates how the risk of dissolution relates to efforts to solve disagreements. We study whether the prevalence of relationship instability in the past among couples is associated with marital locus of control. This is a noncognitive trait that captures individuals perception of control over problems within the couple. We implement a list experiment using the count-item technique to a sample of current real-life couples to elicit truthful answers about couple break-up intentions in the past at the individual level. We find that around 44 per cent of our sample has considered to end their relationship with their partner in the past. The intention to break-up is more prevalent among those who score low in marital locus of control, males, low-income earners, individuals with university studies and couples without children.

Suggested Citation

  • David Boto-Garc'ia & Federico Perali, 2023. "The association between Marital Locus of Control and break-up intentions," Papers 2302.14133, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2302.14133
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