IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ajecsc/v63y2004i4p765-794.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bargaining Over Housework

Author

Listed:
  • Allen M. Parkman

Abstract

. This paper investigates the limited increase in housework provided by husbands in response to higher earnings and labor force participation by their wives. An explanation is provided that integrates the time availability, relative resources, and gender ideology perspectives that traditionally have been used to explain housework decisions. The outcome is the result of a bargaining process in which two concerns are identified as limiting the response of primary wage earning spouses to the employment of secondary wage earning spouses. First, the secondary wage earners’ employment may in part be motivated by a concern about the durability of their marriage rather than their family's welfare. Second, a balancing of the inconveniences and the net earnings of the additional employment may be viewed as making only a limited contribution to the family's welfare. Empirical results of an analysis of the individual household tasks imply that both gender ideology and the spouses’ earnings are important in determining the hours that each spouse devotes to household tasks. When making decisions about the amount of housework to perform, both spouses respond to changes in relative earnings, but the response of husbands, who are usually the primary wage earners, is smaller than that of wives, who tend to be the secondary wage earners.

Suggested Citation

  • Allen M. Parkman, 2004. "Bargaining Over Housework," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 765-794, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:63:y:2004:i:4:p:765-794
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.2004.00316.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2004.00316.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2004.00316.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
    2. Juhn, Chinhui & Murphy, Kevin M, 1997. "Wage Inequality and Family Labor Supply," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 72-97, January.
    3. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages 11-26, Part II, .
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, and Human Capital, pages 299-351, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
    6. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    7. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Harcar, Talha & Spillan, John E., 2006. "Exploring Latin American family decision-making using correspondence analysis," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 221-232, September.
    2. Schaubert, Marianna, 2018. "Do Alimony Regulations Matter inside Marriage? Evidence from the 2008 Reform of the German Maintenance Law," EconStor Preprints 173193, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    3. Bowles, Hannah Riley & McGinn, Kathleen, 2008. "Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game," Working Paper Series rwp08-027, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    4. Michael A. Ash & Sanjiv Gupta, 2006. "Whose Money, Whose Time? A Nonparametric Approach to Modeling Time Spent on Housework," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2006-06, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    5. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta & Schmitt, Christian, 2020. "Multi-dimensional couple bargaining and housework allocation," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 63(1), pages 3-22.
    6. Smith, Ian, 2007. "Property division on divorce with inequity aversion," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 111-128.
    7. Sanjiv Gupta & Michael Ash, 2008. "Whose money, whose time? A nonparametric approach to modeling time spent on housework in the United States," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(1), pages 93-120.
    8. Noraani Mustapha & Aminah Ahmad & Jegak Uli & Khairuddin Idris, 2011. "Work-Family Factors and its Relationships Between Dispositional, Occupational Characteristics and Intention to Stay," International Journal of Business Research and Management (IJBRM), Computer Science Journals (CSC Journals), vol. 2(3), pages 74-92, October.
    9. Schaubert, Marianna, 2018. "Do Alimony Regulations Matter inside Marriage? Evidence from the 2008 Reform of the German Maintenance Law," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181508, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Bernardo, Christina & Paleti, Rajesh & Hoklas, Megan & Bhat, Chandra, 2015. "An empirical investigation into the time-use and activity patterns of dual-earner couples with and without young children," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 71-91.
    11. Woojin Chung & Roeul Kim, 2020. "Which Occupation is Highly Associated with Cognitive Impairment? A Gender-Specific Longitudinal Study of Paid and Unpaid Occupations in South Korea," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(21), pages 1-17, October.
    12. Meurs, Mieke & Slavchevska, Vanya, 2014. "Doing it all: Women’s employment and reproductive work in Tajikistan," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 786-803.
    13. Boarnet, Marlon G. & Hsu, Hsin-Ping, 2015. "The gender gap in non-work travel: The relative roles of income earning potential and land use," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 111-127.
    14. Renzo Carriero & Lorenzo Todesco, 2018. "Housework division and gender ideology: When do attitudes really matter?," Demographic Research, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany, vol. 39(39), pages 1039-1064.
    15. Nabanita Datta Gupta & Leslie S Stratton, 2008. "Institutions, Social Norms, and Bargaining Power: An Analysis of Individual Leisure Time in Couple Households," Working Papers 0806, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
    16. Ching-Fen Lee & Shain-May Tang, 2022. "What Type of Housework Happiness Do You Prefer? Does Gender and Health Matter? A Taiwanese Study," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(14), pages 1-12, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Man Si, 2015. "Intrafamily bargaining and love," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 771-789, December.
    2. Mariano Rojas, 2008. "Intra-Household Arrangements and Health Satisfaction: Evidence from Mexico," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2008-57, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Bowles, Roger & Garoupa, Nuno, 2002. "Household dissolution, child care and divorce law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 495-510, December.
    4. COOKE Lynn Prince, 2001. "Impact of Dual Careers on Average Family Size: Comparison of 11 Countries," IRISS Working Paper Series 2001-05, IRISS at CEPS/INSTEAD.
    5. Patricia Apps & Ray Rees, 2007. "Household Models: An Historical Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 2172, CESifo.
    6. Nevena, Kulic & Giulia, Dotti Sani, 2015. "Intra-household sharing of financial resources: A non-technical review of the research field and its historical development," MPRA Paper 68420, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Alessandro Cigno, 2011. "The Economics of Marriage," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(s1), pages 28-41, May.
    8. Jara-Díaz, Sergio & Rosales-Salas, Jorge, 2017. "Beyond transport time: A review of time use modeling," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 209-230.
    9. Alberto Alesina & Andrea Ichino & Loukas Karabarbounis, 2011. "Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 1-40, May.
    10. Diana Mok, 2007. "Do Two-earner Households Base Their Choice of Residential Location on Both Incomes?," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 44(4), pages 723-750, April.
    11. Mariano Rojas, 2010. "Intra-Household Arrangements and Economic Satisfaction," Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 225-241, April.
    12. Gillian Hewitson, 2001. "A Survey of Feminist Economics," Working Papers 2001.01, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    13. Levin, Mark (Левин, Марк) & Matrosova, Ksenia (Матросова, Ксения), 2018. "Development and Research of Economic Behavior of Households in Changing Conditions [Разработка И Исследование Экономического Поведения Домохозяйств В Изменяющихся Условиях]," Working Papers 041825, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    14. Telalagic, S., 2012. "Domestic Production as a Source of Marital Power: Theory and Evidence from Malawi," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1243, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    15. Shelly Lundberg & Aloysius Siow, 2017. "Canadian contributions to family economics," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(5), pages 1304-1323, December.
    16. Doepke, Matthias & Kindermann, Fabian, 2014. "Intrahousehold Decision Making and Fertility," IZA Discussion Papers 8726, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Rubalcava, L. & Thomas, D., 2000. "Family Bargaining and Welfare," Papers 00-10, RAND - Labor and Population Program.
    18. Carvajal, Andrés & González, Natalia, 2014. "On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 177-186.
    19. Marina Della Giusta & Sarah Jewell & Uma Kambhampati, 2010. "Anything to Keep You Happy?," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2010-01, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
    20. Barham, Vicky & Devlin, Rose Anne & Yang, Jie, 2009. "A theory of rational marriage and divorce," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 93-106, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:63:y:2004:i:4:p:765-794. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0002-9246 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.