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Institutions, Social Norms, and Bargaining Power: An Analysis of Individual Leisure Time in Couple Households

  • Datta Gupta, Nabanita

    ()

    (Aarhus University)

  • Stratton, Leslie S.

    ()

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

We exploit time use data from Denmark and the United States to examine the impact institutions and social norms have on individuals' bargaining power within a household, hypothesizing that the more generous social welfare system and more egalitarian social norms in Denmark will mitigate the impact standard economic power measures have upon couples' time use. Further we posit that leisure time will be more sensitive to power considerations than housework time which may be more influenced by preferences regarding household public goods, to gendered notions of time use, and to censoring. Our results are generally supportive of these hypotheses, with leisure time on non-work days in the US being particularly responsive to economic power. In addition, we find some evidence that institutions matter as women in the US who are more likely to receive welfare benefits enjoy more leisure time than would be suggested by their economic power alone.

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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3773.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Review of Economics of the Household, 2010, 8 (3), 325-343
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3773
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  1. Michael Burda & Daniel S. Hamermesh & Philippe Weil, 2007. "Total Work, Gender and Social Norms," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2007-058, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  2. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
  3. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
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  6. Eric J. Solberg & David C. Wong, 1992. "Family Time Use: Leisure, Home Production, Market Work, and Work Related Travel," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 27(3), pages 485-510.
  7. Robert A. Pollak, 2005. "Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production," NBER Working Papers 11239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-67, June.
  9. Chris van Klaveren & Bernard M.S. van Praag & Henriette Maassen van den Brink, 2008. "A Public Good Version of the Collective Household Model: An Empirical Approach with an Application to British Household Data," CESifo Working Paper Series 2190, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Shelly Lundberg & Elaina Rose, 1998. "The Determinants of Specialization Within Marriage," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0048, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  11. Helene Couprie, 2003. "Time allocation within the family: welfare implications of life in a couple," Labor and Demography 0312003, EconWPA.
  12. Shoshana Grossbard & Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, 2008. "Cohort-level sex ratio effects on women’s labor force participation," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 309-309, September.
  13. Espen Bratberg & Sigve Tjøtta, 2008. "Income effects of divorce in families with dependent children," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 439-461, April.
  14. El Lahga, AbdelRahmen & Moreau, Nicolas, 2007. "The Effects of Marriage on Couples’ Allocation of Time Between Market and Non-Market Hours," IZA Discussion Papers 2619, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  15. Chris van Klaveren & Bernard M.S. van Praag & Henriette Maassen van den Brink, 2008. "A Public Good Version of the Collective Household Model: An Empirical Approach with an Application to British Household Data," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-018/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  16. Michael Bittman & Paula England & Nancy Folbre & George Matheson, 2001. "When Gender Trumps Money: Bargaining and Time in Household Work," JCPR Working Papers 221, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
  17. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
  18. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 132-37, May.
  19. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 2001. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," Cahiers de recherche 0103, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  20. Jean Kimmel & Rachel Connelly, 2007. "Mothers’ Time Choices: Caregiving, Leisure, Home Production, and Paid Work," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 42(3).
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  22. van der Lippe, Tanja & Siegers, Jacques J, 1994. "Division of Household and Paid Labour between Partners: Effects of Relative Wage Rates and Social Norms," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 109-36.
  23. Apps, Patricia & Rees, Ray, 2007. "Cooperative Household Models," IZA Discussion Papers 3127, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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