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Institutions, Social Norms, and Bargaining Power: An Analysis of Individual Leisure Time in Couple Households

  • Nabanita Datta Gupta

    ()

    (Danish National Centre for Social Research)

  • Leslie S Stratton

    ()

    (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business)

We exploit time use data from Denmark and the United States to examine the impact institutions and social norms have on individuals' bargaining power within a household, hypothesizing that the more generous social welfare system and more egalitarian social norms in Denmark will mitigate the impact standard economic power measures have upon couples' time use. Further we posit that leisure time will be more sensitive to power considerations than housework time which may be more influenced by preferences regarding household public goods, to gendered notions of time use, and to censoring. Our results are generally supportive of these hypotheses, with leisure time on non-work days in the US being particularly responsive to economic power. In addition, we find some evidence that institutions matter as women in the US who are more likely to receive welfare benefits enjoy more leisure time than would be suggested by their economic power alone.

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Paper provided by VCU School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0806.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vcu:wpaper:0806
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Web page: http://www.business.vcu.edu/economics

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  2. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2001. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-16, CIRANO.
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  4. El Lahga, AbdelRahmen & Moreau, Nicolas, 2007. "The Effects of Marriage on Couples’ Allocation of Time Between Market and Non-Market Hours," IZA Discussion Papers 2619, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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  7. Shelly Lundberg & Elaina Rose, 1999. "The Determinants of Specialization within Marriage," Working Papers UWEC-2005-07, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
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  9. Chris van Klaveren & Bernard M.S. van Praag & Henriette Maassen van den Brink, 2008. "A Public Good Version of the Collective Household Model: An Empirical Approach with an Application to British Household Data," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-018/3, Tinbergen Institute.
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  12. Espen Bratberg & Sigve Tjøtta, 2008. "Income effects of divorce in families with dependent children," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 439-461, April.
  13. Chris van Klaveren & Bernard M.S. van Praag & Henriette Maassen van den Brink, 2008. "A Public Good Version of the Collective Household Model: An Empirical Approach with an Application to British Household Data," CESifo Working Paper Series 2190, CESifo Group Munich.
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  15. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
  16. Apps, Patricia & Rees, Ray, 2007. "Cooperative Household Models," IZA Discussion Papers 3127, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  17. Robert A. Pollak, 2005. "Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production," NBER Working Papers 11239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Michael Bittman & Paula England & Nancy Folbre & George Matheson, 2001. "When Gender Trumps Money: Bargaining and Time in Household Work," JCPR Working Papers 221, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
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  23. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
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