Anything to Keep You Happy?
Whilst there is an abundant supply of theoretical and empirical contributions in cooperative bargaining models on the transfer of material resources within couples and the labour supply patterns of individuals in couples, this literature has so far not been interested in measuring empirically the utilities of partners. Conversely the literature on hedonic wellbeing has recently moved on to assess couple’s happiness and the extent to which individuals in couples influence each other’s happiness without making reference to the problem of allocation of resources. The latter is however important to both the individual and couple happiness, and in the limit determine whether couples stay together. Here we address the role of the allocation of resources, particularly in the form of time use time and the effect it has on the joint and individual utilities in the couple.
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- Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
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Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
02-024/3, Tinbergen Institute.
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"Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market,"
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- Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Working Papers 91-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
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