IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cca/wchild/125.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

How Do Family Members Negotiate to Reach a Bargaining Agreement? A Study of Intrahousehold Behavior

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Paul Chavas
  • Eleonora Matteazzi
  • Martina Menon
  • Federico Perali

Abstract

We study intrahousehold behavior and investigate how family members negotiate to reach an agreement, recognizing that the negotiation process is relevant, though often costly. We focus not only on the efficient outcomes of the decision-making process, but also on the negotiation process. We propose an evolutionary bargaining approach that evaluates individual bargaining power as a function of the perceived cost of negotiation failure. The analysis extends the original Nash-Harsanyi cardinal representation to ordinal preferences and rationalizes agreements that may be inefficient. We show how bounded rationality generates a latent budget constraint that can be useful in modeling household behavior. The implications for efficiency and income distribution are discussed. We illustrate the usefulness of our theory in an empirical application.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Paul Chavas & Eleonora Matteazzi & Martina Menon & Federico Perali, 2025. "How Do Family Members Negotiate to Reach a Bargaining Agreement? A Study of Intrahousehold Behavior," CHILD Working Papers Series 125 JEL Classification: D, Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD) - CCA.
  • Handle: RePEc:cca:wchild:125
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.child.carloalberto.org/images/documenti/child125_2025.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Browning,Martin & Chiappori,Pierre-André & Weiss,Yoram, 2014. "Economics of the Family," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521795395, January.
    3. Jean Paul Chavas, 2015. "Coase Revisited: Economic Efficiency under Externalities, Transaction Costs, and Nonconvexity," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(4), pages 709-734, December.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1, October.
    5. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    6. Arthur Lewbel & Krishna Pendakur, 2022. "Inefficient Collective Households: Cooperation and Consumption," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(645), pages 1882-1893.
    7. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-1186, September.
    8. Udry, Christopher, 1996. "Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 1010-1046, October.
    9. Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner & Guillaume Vandenbroucke, 2017. "Family Economics Writ Large," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(4), pages 1346-1434, December.
    10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5454 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Chavas, Jean-Paul & Menon, Martina & Pagani, Elisa & Perali, Federico, 2018. "Collective household welfare and intra-household inequality," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    12. Marcos A. Rangel & Duncan Thomas, 2019. "Decision-Making in Complex Households," Working Papers 2019-070, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    13. Marcos Rangel & Duncan Thomas, 2019. "Decision-Making in Complex Households," NBER Working Papers 26511, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. David Boto‐García & Federico Perali, 2024. "The association between marital locus of control and break‐up intentions," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 83(1), pages 35-57, January.
    15. Ryan Oprea, 2021. "What Makes a Rule Complex? Erratum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(2), pages 755-755, February.
    16. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni & Ivana Komunjer, 2012. "Learning from a Piece of Pie," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(1), pages 162-195.
    17. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    18. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
    19. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-467, June.
    20. Jean-Paul Chavas & Runhao Wang, 2021. "Evolutionary economics under nonconvexity and externalities," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(3), pages 1369-1389.
    21. Murnighan, J Keith & Roth, Alvin E & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1988. "Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 101-124, March.
    22. de Palma, Andre & Myers, Gordon M & Papageorgiou, Yorgos Y, 1994. "Rational Choice under an Imperfect Ability to Choose," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 419-440, June.
    23. Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner & Guillaume Vandenbroucke, 2017. "Family Economics Writ Large," Working Papers wp2018_1706, CEMFI.
    24. P.-A. Chiappori & O. Donni & I. Komunjer, 2012. "Learning from a Piece of Pie," Post-Print hal-04264549, HAL.
    25. Deaton,Angus & Muellbauer,John, 1980. "Economics and Consumer Behavior," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521296762, November.
    26. Hanany, Eran & Safra, Zvi, 2000. "Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 254-276, February.
    27. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
    28. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
    29. , H., 2010. "Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(1), January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jean-Paul Chavas & Eleonora Matteazzi & Martina Menon & Federico Perali, 2022. "(In)Efficient Bargaining in the Family," Working Papers 2, SITES.
    2. Jean-Paul Chavas & Eleonora Matteazzi & Martina Menon & Federico Perali, 2021. "Bargaining in the Family," CHILD Working Papers Series 88 JEL Classification: D1, Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD) - CCA.
    3. Bergolo, Marcelo & Galván, Estefanía, 2018. "Intra-household Behavioral Responses to Cash Transfer Programs. Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 100-118.
    4. Thomas TB Baudin & Bram De Rock & Paula Eugenia Gobbi, 2021. "Economics and Family Structures," Working Papers ECARES 2021-21, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    5. Lee, Jungmin, 2007. "Marriage, the Sharing Rule, and Pocket Money: The Case of South Korea," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(3), pages 557-581, April.
    6. Brown, Caitlin & Calvi, Rossella & Penglase, Jacob, 2021. "Sharing the pie: An analysis of undernutrition and individual consumption in Bangladesh," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    7. Calvi, Rossella & Penglase, Jacob & Tommasi, Denni & Wolf, Alexander, 2023. "The more the poorer? Resource sharing and scale economies in large families," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    8. Valérie Lechene & Krishna Pendakur & Alexander Wolf, 2020. "OLS estimation of the intra-household distribution of expenditure," IFS Working Papers W20/6, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    9. Arthur-Holmes, Francis & Abrefa Busia, Kwaku, 2020. "Household dynamics and the bargaining power of women in artisanal and small-scale mining in sub-Saharan Africa: A Ghanaian case study," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    10. Patricia Apps & Ray Rees, 2007. "Household Models: An Historical Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 2172, CESifo.
    11. Iyigun, Murat & Walsh, Randall P., 2007. "Endogenous gender power, household labor supply and the demographic transition," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 138-155, January.
    12. Olivier Bargain & Nicolas Moreau, 2002. "Is the collective model of labor supply useful for tax policy analysis ? A simulation exercise," DELTA Working Papers 2002-21, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    13. De Rock, Bram & Cherchye, Laurens & Chiappori, Pierre-André & Ringdal, Charlotte & Vermeulen, Frederic, 2021. "Feed the children," CEPR Discussion Papers 16482, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Jara-Díaz, Sergio & Rosales-Salas, Jorge, 2017. "Beyond transport time: A review of time use modeling," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 209-230.
    15. Ulugbek Aminjonov & Olivier Bargain & Maira Colacce & Luca Tiberti, 2022. "Culture, Intra-household Distribution and Individual Poverty," Working Papers - Economics wp2022_21.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    16. Doepke, M. & Tertilt, M., 2016. "Families in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1789-1891, Elsevier.
    17. Matthias Doepke & Michèle Tertilt, 2019. "Does female empowerment promote economic development?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 309-343, December.
    18. Beltramo, Theresa P. & Calvi, Rossella & De Giorgi, Giacomo & Sarr, Ibrahima, 2023. "Child poverty among refugees," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    19. Robert A. Pollak, 2012. "Allocating Time: Individuals' Technologies, Household Technology, Perfect Substitutes, and Specialization," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 105-106, pages 75-97.
    20. Laurens CHERCHYE & Thomas DEMUYNCK & Bram DE ROCK, 2010. "Noncooperative household consumption with caring," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces10.34, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cca:wchild:125. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Giovanni Bert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/chccait.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.