Marriage, the Sharing Rule, and Pocket Money: The Case of South Korea
Using longitudinal data on private consumption from South Korea, this article examines the marital balance of power between spouses in a dynamic setting by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity at the household level and spouses' time-constant unobserved bargaining power. I find that unobserved power plays a significant role in intrahousehold resource allocation. The income pooling hypothesis is no longer rejected after accounting for unobserved power. Relative spousal earnings may be a good proxy for the long-term balance of power to an extent that cross-sectional variation in relative earnings across households reflects the pattern of spousal matching. However within-marriage changes in relative earnings do not induce any significant resource transfer between spouses. The balance of bargaining power is stable within marriage.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:y:2007:v:55:i:3:p:557-81. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.