Marriage, the Sharing Rule, and Pocket Money: The Case of South Korea
Using longitudinal data on private consumption from South Korea, this article examines the marital balance of power between spouses in a dynamic setting by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity at the household level and spousesâ€™ time-constant unobserved bargaining power. I find that unobserved power plays a significant role in intrahousehold resource allocation. The income pooling hypothesis is no longer rejected after accounting for unobserved power. Relative spousal earnings may be a good proxy for the long-term balance of power to an extent that cross-sectional variation in relative earnings across households reflects the pattern of spousal matching. However within-marriage changes in relative earnings do not induce any significant resource transfer between spouses. The balance of bargaining power is stable within marriage.
Volume (Year): 55 (2007)
Issue (Month): ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/EDCC/|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:v:55:y:2007:p:557-581. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.