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Family Bargaining and Taxes: A Prolegomenon to the Analysis of Joint Taxation

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  • Robert A. Pollak

Abstract

Does joint taxation disadvantage women? To answer that question, this article begins by reviewing bargaining models of intrafamily allocation and discussing the determinants of 'bargaining power'. It argues that wage rates rather than earnings are determinants of bargaining power, and that productivity in household production is also a determinant of bargaining power. In the absence of human capital effects, joint taxation does not appear to disadvantage women in bargaining. Hence, the claim that joint taxation disadvantages women, if correct, depends on effects that operate through incentives to accumulate human capital. But a satisfactory analysis of the effects of taxation on human capital awaits the further development of dynamic models of family bargaining. (JEL codes: H21, H24, D13, J22) Copyright The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert A. Pollak, 2011. "Family Bargaining and Taxes: A Prolegomenon to the Analysis of Joint Taxation ," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 57(2), pages 216-244, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:57:y:2011:i:2:p:216-244
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ifr008
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    Cited by:

    1. Haizhen Mou & Stanley L. Winer, 2010. "Fiscal Incidence When Both Individual Welfare and Family Structure Matter: The Case of Subsidization of Home -care for the Elderly," ICER Working Papers 15-2010, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    2. Gugl, Elisabeth & Leroux, Justin, 2011. "Share the gain, share the pain? Almost transferable utility, changes in production possibilities, and bargaining solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 133-143.
    3. Majlesi, Kaveh, 2016. "Labor market opportunities and women's decision making power within households," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 34-47.
    4. Paul Fisher, 2016. "British tax credit simplification, the intra-household distribution of income and family consumption," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 444-464.
    5. Alberto Alesina & Andrea Ichino & Loukas Karabarbounis, 2011. "Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 1-40, May.
    6. Mizuki Komura, 2013. "Tax reform and endogenous gender bargaining power," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 175-192, June.
    7. Hofmarcher, Thomas & Plug, Erik, 2022. "Specialization in same-sex and different-sex couples," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    8. Olivier Bargain & Olivier Donni, 2014. "Optimal Commodity Taxation and Redistribution within Households," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(321), pages 48-62, January.
    9. Robert A. Pollak, 2005. "Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production," NBER Working Papers 11239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. repec:osf:socarx:pkcqd_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Loukas Karabarbounis & Andrea Ichino & Alberto Alesina, 2008. "Gender based Taxation," 2008 Meeting Papers 500, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Bell, Clive & Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik T., 2012. "Raising juveniles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 32-51.
    13. Akira Yakita, 2018. "Fertility and education decisions and child-care policy effects in a Nash-bargaining family model," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 31(4), pages 1177-1201, October.
    14. Costa, Carlos Eugênio da & Diniz, Érica, 2012. "Tax filing choices for the household under separable spheres bargaining," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 733, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    15. Melanie Schröder & Norma Burow, 2016. "Couple's Labor Supply, Taxes, and the Division of Housework in a Gender-Neutral Lab," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1593, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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