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Optimal Commodity Taxation and Redistribution within Households

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  • Donni Olivier

    () (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise)

  • Bargain Olivier

    (University College of Dublin, CHILD and IZA)

Abstract

Using a collective model of consumption, we characterize optimal commodity taxes aimed at targeting specific individuals within the household. The main message is that distortionary indirect taxation can circumvent the agency problem of the household. Essentially, taxation should discourage less the consumption of a certain group of goods: those for which the slope of the Engel curves is larger for the targeted person.

Suggested Citation

  • Donni Olivier & Bargain Olivier, 2011. "Optimal Commodity Taxation and Redistribution within Households," THEMA Working Papers 2011-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2011-07
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    File URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2011-07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Roeder, Kerstin, 2017. "Household Bargaining, Spouses' Consumption Patterns and the Design of Commodity Taxes," IZA Discussion Papers 10557, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Molina, Jose Alberto & Velilla, Jorge & Ortega, Raquel, 2015. "The decision to become an entrepreneur in Spain: The role of the household financial situation," MPRA Paper 68101, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    optimal commodity taxation; targeting; intrahousehold distribution.;

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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