Marriage payments and bargaining power of women in rural Bangladesh
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More about this item
Keywordsmarriage market; marriage payments; female bargaining power; contraceptive use; rural Bangladesh;
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEM-2012-01-03 (Demographic Economics)
- NEP-DEV-2012-01-03 (Development)
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