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Marriage payments and bargaining power of women in rural Bangladesh

  • Nazia Mansoor


This study examines the relationship between bargaining power and the use of contraceptives in the household. Using data from rural Bangladesh in 1998-1999 it investigates whether women in a relatively strong bargaining position at the time of marriage continue to remain in a strong position post marriage as seen by their decision to use the contraceptive pill. Empirical results from multinomial logit provide evidence for this showing that as brideprice, taken as a fraction of total household marriage payment, increases from 0.1 to 0.3 the predicted probability of the mother using the contraceptive pill increases by 8 percentage points.

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Paper provided by School of Economics, University of Kent in its series Studies in Economics with number 1119.

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Date of creation: Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:1119
Contact details of provider: Postal: School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP
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  1. Siwan Anderson, 2003. "Why Dowry Payments Declined with Modernization in Europe but Are Rising in India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(2), pages 269-310, April.
  2. Browning, Martin & Francois Bourguignon & Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Valerie Lechene, 1994. "Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1067-96, December.
  3. Shelly Lundberg & Jennifer Ward-Batts, 2000. "Saving for Retirement: Household Bargaining and Household Net Worth," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0026, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  4. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Haddad, Lawrence & Hoddinott, John & Kanbur, Ravi, 1993. "Unitary versus collective models of the household : time to shift theburden of proof?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1217, The World Bank.
  5. Siwan Anderson, 2007. "The Economics of Dowry and Brideprice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 151-174, Fall.
  6. Murat Nick & P. Randall Walsh, 2007. "Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 507-535.
  7. Quisumbing, Agnes R. & de la Briere, Benedicte, 2000. "Women's assets and intrahousehold allocation in rural Bangladesh," FCND discussion papers 86, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  8. Cowell, Frank A., 2006. "Microeconomics: Principles and Analysis," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199267774.
  9. Suen, Wing & Chan, William & Zhang, Junsen, 2003. "Marital transfer and intra-household allocation: a Nash-bargaining analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 133-146, September.
  10. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Gaspart, Frederic, 2007. "The Perverse Effects of High Brideprices," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 1221-1236, July.
  11. Anderson, Siwan, 2007. "Why the marriage squeeze cannot cause dowry inflation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 140-152, November.
  12. Mark Pin & Shahidur Khandker & Signe-Mary Mckernan & M. Latif, 1999. "Credit programs for the poor and reproductive behavior in low-income countries: Are the reported causal relationships the result of heterogeneity bias?," Demography, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 1-21, February.
  13. Anderson, S., 1999. "The Economics of Dowry Payments in Pakistan," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 691, The University of Melbourne.
  14. Pierre-André Chiappori & Sonia Oreffice, 2008. "Birth Control and Female Empowerment: An Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(1), pages 113-140, 02.
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