Unitary versus Collective Models of the Household: Time to Shift the Burden of Proof?
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Other versions of this item:
- Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Haddad, Lawrence & Hoddinott, John & Kanbur, Ravi, 1993. "Unitary versus collective models of the household : time to shift theburden of proof?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1217, The World Bank.
References listed on IDEAS
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