IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jcecon/v45y2017i2p224-245.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Love, money, and parental goods: Does parental matchmaking matter?

Author

Listed:
  • Huang, Fali
  • Jin, Ginger Zhe
  • Xu, Lixin Colin

Abstract

While parental matchmaking has been widespread throughout history and across countries, we know little about the relationship between parental matchmaking and marriage outcomes. Does parental involvement in matchmaking help ensure their needs are better taken care of by married children? This paper finds supportive evidence using a survey of Chinese couples. In particular, parental involvement in matchmaking is associated with having a more submissive wife, a greater number of children, a higher likelihood of having any male children, and a stronger belief of the husband in providing old age support to his parents. These benefits, however, are achieved at the cost of less marital harmony within the couple and lower market income of the wife. The results render support to and extend the findings of (Becker et al., 2015) where parents meddle with children’s preferences to ensure their commitment to providing parental goods such as old age support.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Fali & Jin, Ginger Zhe & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2017. "Love, money, and parental goods: Does parental matchmaking matter?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 224-245.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:45:y:2017:i:2:p:224-245
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2016.09.005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596716300592
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Finlay, Keith & Magnusson, Leandro M., 2009. "Implementing weak-instrument robust tests for a general class of instrumental-variables models," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 9(3), pages 1-24.
    2. Junsen Zhang & William Chan, 1999. "Dowry and Wife's Welfare: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(4), pages 786-808, August.
    3. Raquel Fernández & Nezih Guner & John Knowles, 2005. "Love and Money: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Household Sorting and Inequality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(1), pages 273-344.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1, September.
    5. Chong Huang & Hongbin Li & Pak Wai Liu & Junsen Zhang, 2009. "Why Does Spousal Education Matter for Earnings? Assortative Mating and Cross-Productivity," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(4), pages 633-652, October.
    6. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages 11-26, Part II, .
    7. Josh Angrist, 2002. "How Do Sex Ratios Affect Marriage and Labor Markets? Evidence from America's Second Generation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(3), pages 997-1038.
    8. Weiss, Yoram & Willis, Robert J, 1997. "Match Quality, New Information, and Marital Dissolution," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 293-329, January.
    9. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2002. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 37-72, February.
    10. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy & Jörg L. Spenkuch, 2016. "The Manipulation of Children's Preferences, Old-Age Support, and Investment in Children's Human Capital," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(S2), pages 3-30.
    11. Siwan Anderson, 2003. "Why Dowry Payments Declined with Modernization in Europe but Are Rising in India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(2), pages 269-310, April.
    12. Zeng Yi & Wu Deqing, 2000. "A regional analysis of divorce in China since 1980," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 37(2), pages 215-219, May.
    13. Davidson, Audrey B. & Ekelund, Robert Jr., 1997. "The medieval church and rents from marriage market regulations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 215-245, February.
    14. Xiaohe Xu, 1996. "Measuring the concept of marital quality as social indicators in urban China," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-206, February.
    15. Zachary Zimmer & Julia Kwong, 2003. "Family size and support of older adults in urban and rural China: Current effects and future implications," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 40(1), pages 23-44, February.
    16. Siwan Anderson, 2007. "The Economics of Dowry and Brideprice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 151-174, Fall.
    17. Fali Huang & Ginger Zhe Jin & Lixin Colin Xu, 2012. "Love and Money by Parental Matchmaking: Evidence from Urban Couples in China," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 555-560, May.
    18. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    19. Hongbin Li & PakWai Liu & Junsen Zhang & Ning Ma, 2007. "Economic Returns to Communist Party Membership: Evidence From Urban Chinese Twins," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(523), pages 1504-1520, October.
    20. Suen, Wing & Chan, William & Zhang, Junsen, 2003. "Marital transfer and intra-household allocation: a Nash-bargaining analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 133-146, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:jcecon:v:45:y:2017:i:2:p:217-218 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Xu Lixin Colin, 2016. "Cheung, Becker and Marriage," Man and the Economy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 65-76, June.
    3. You, Jing & Yi, Xuejie & Chen, Meng, 2016. "Love, Life, and “Leftover Ladies” in Urban China," MPRA Paper 70494, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Marriage; Matchmaking; Parental matchmaking; China; Agency cost; Old age support; Parental goods; Preference manipulation; Endogenous institutions;

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:45:y:2017:i:2:p:224-245. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.