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Love and Money by Parental Matchmaking: Evidence from Urban Couples in China

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  • Fali Huang
  • Ginger Zhe Jin
  • Lixin Colin Xu

Abstract

Parental involvement in marriage matchmaking may distort the optimal spouse choice because parents are willing to substitute love for money. The rationale is that the joint income of married children can be shared among extended family members more easily than mutual attraction felt by the couple themselves, and as a result, the best spouse candidate in the parents' eyes can differ from what is optimal to the individual, even though parents are altruistic and care dearly about their children's welfare. We find supporting evidence for this prediction using a unique sample of urban couples in China in the early 1990s.

Suggested Citation

  • Fali Huang & Ginger Zhe Jin & Lixin Colin Xu, 2012. "Love and Money by Parental Matchmaking: Evidence from Urban Couples in China," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 555-560, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:3:p:555-60
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lena Edlund & Nils-Petter Lagerlöf, 2006. "Individual versus Parental Consent in Marriage: Implications for Intra-Household Resource Allocation and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 304-307, May.
    2. Raquel Fernández & Nezih Guner & John Knowles, 2005. "Love and Money: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Household Sorting and Inequality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(1), pages 273-344.
    3. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    4. Siwan Anderson, 2003. "Why Dowry Payments Declined with Modernization in Europe but Are Rising in India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(2), pages 269-310, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kai Konrad, 2015. "Affection, speed dating and heartbreaking," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 159-172, January.
    2. Siwan Anderson & Chris Bidner, 2021. "An Institutional Perspective on the Economics of the Family," Discussion Papers dp21-14, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    3. Qijia Lyu & Linxiu Zhang, 2021. "Love Match, Marriage Distance, and Marriage Payment: Evidence from Rural China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(23), pages 1-19, November.
    4. Gupta, Tanu & Negi, Digvijay, 2021. "Daughter Vs. Daughter-in-Law: Kinship Roles and Women’s Time Use in India," 2021 Conference, August 17-31, 2021, Virtual 315021, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. Huang, Fali & Jin, Ginger Zhe & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2017. "Love, money, and parental goods: Does parental matchmaking matter?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 224-245.
    6. Eva Raiber & Weiwei Ren & Jeanne Bovet & Paul Seabright & Charlotte Wang, 2023. "What Do Parents Want? Parental Spousal Preferences in China," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71(3), pages 903-939.
    7. Bowen Li & Cai Zhou & Ji Luo, 2022. "Way of love and after‐marriage well‐being: Evidence from China," International Studies of Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(3), pages 394-410, September.
    8. Shing-Yi Wang, 2013. "Marriage Networks, Nepotism, and Labor Market Outcomes in China," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 91-112, July.
    9. Pauline Morault, 2017. "Arranged Marriages under Transferable Utilities," Working Papers halshs-01537971, HAL.
    10. Sugata Bag & Anirban Kar, 2022. "“Made in Heaven, Matched by Parents”: Does Arranged Marriage Restrict Labour Market Autonomy and Participation of Women? Theory and Evidence from India," Working papers 317, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    11. Huang, Fali & Jin, Ginger Zhe & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2015. "Love, money, and old age support : does parental matchmaking matter ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7188, The World Bank.
    12. Amavilah, Voxi Heinrich, 2013. "The Love Aspects of Human Capital and the Economic Activity of Countries," MPRA Paper 52686, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Du, Shichao, 2023. "(Un)Health from parental intervention: Does the marriage formation pathway influence married people's health?," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 336(C).
    14. Yao, Yuxin & Zhang, Min & Li, Yixian, 2023. "Sex ratios and marital matching outcomes in the Chinese marriage market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    15. Xu Lixin Colin, 2016. "Cheung, Becker and Marriage," Man and the Economy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 65-76, June.

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