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Assortative Matching on Income

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Abstract

We analyze marital matching on income using an extremely rich Dutch data set containing all income tax files over four years. We develop a novel methodology that directly extends previous contributions to allow for highly flexible matching patterns. Investigating all marriages that took place between 2011 and 2014, we find that marital patterns remain remarkably stable over the period. While a majority of couples match assortatively, a small but significant minority display negative assortative matching. We also show that standard approaches, which consider all married couples using current incomes, may generate misleading conclusions. Finally, we find that, in contrast with recent results, whether his income exceeds her does not seem to play any significant role.

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  • Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Fioro, Carlo & Galichon, Alfred & Verzillo, Stefano, 2022. "Assortative Matching on Income," JRC Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2022-07, Joint Research Centre, European Commission.
    • Handle: RePEc:jrs:wpaper:202207
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    File URL: https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/publications/assortative-matching-income_en
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    Cited by:

    1. Nico Pestel, 2021. "Searching on campus? The marriage market effects of changing student sex ratios," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 1175-1207, December.

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    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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