Structural Estimation of Marriage Models
This paper uses a structural approach to examine who matches with whom. A two-sided matching model that allows for marital sorting in response to marriage market flexibility and agents' preferences is utilized. Estimation is based on imbedding the numerical solution of a matching model within a maximum-likelihood procedure. Results using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID, 1968-1993) indicate that wage is a more desirable trait than education in predicting marriageability for white men, while education is more desirable for black men. The marriage market for white men is also more flexible. The desirability of wage and marriage market flexibility both decrease with age for white men. The effects of age for black men are mixed.
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|Date of creation:||01 Apr 2001|
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- Bergstrom, Ted & Schoeni, Robert F, 1996.
"Income Prospects and Age-at-Marriage,"
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