Structural Estimation of Marriage Models
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Other versions of this item:
- Wong, Linda, 2001. "Structural Estimation of Marriage Models," 10th International Conference on Panel Data, Berlin, July 5-6, 2002 A1-1, International Conferences on Panel Data.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsPositive Assortative Matching; Marriage Classes; Classification Errors;
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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