The schooling repayment hypothesis for private transfers:Evidence from the PROGRESA/Oportunidades experiment
The schooling repayment hypothesis for private transfers predicts a positive relationship between the amount of parental investment in childrens education and the amount that adult children transfer to their parents. This paper provides evidence on the repayment motive using data from the Mexican conditional cash transfer program PROGRESA/Oportunidades. The program pays a transfer to parents for sending their children to school. Thus, if private transfers from adult children to parents are in part repayment for parental schooling investments made in the past, then PROGRESA/Oportunidades should decrease these transfers, because parents were already exogenously compensated by the government for sending their kids to school and not to work. Exploiting the exogenous variation in the amount of cash transfers a household receives from the program for sending its children to school, we compare the private transfers received in 2007 by parental households who had children 0-16 in 1997 and started receivin the programs bene ts in 1998 with the transfers received by similar parental households who started receiving bene ts in 1999. Our results suggest that (i) there exists a repayment motive and (ii) that PROGRESA/Oportunidades is causing adult children to transfer less resources to their parents.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Camino a Sta. Teresa 930, Mexico, D.F. 10700|
Phone: +525 628 4197
Fax: +525 628 4058
Web page: http://cie.itam.mx/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Skoufias, Emmanuel & Parker, Susan W., 2001.
"Conditional cash transfers and their impact on child work and schooling,"
FCND discussion papers
123, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Skoufias, Emmanuel & Parker, Susan W., 2001. "Conditional cash transfers and their impact on child work and schooling," FCND briefs 123, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Donald Cox & Zekeriya Eser & Emmanuel Jimenez, 1996.
"Motives for Private Transfers over the Life Cycle: An Analytical Framework and Evidence for Peru,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
327., Boston College Department of Economics.
- Cox, Donald & Eser, Zekeriya & Jimenez, Emmanuel, 1998. "Motives for private transfers over the life cycle: An analytical framework and evidence for Peru," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 57-80, February.
- Jere R. Behrman & Susan W. Parker & Petra E. Todd, 2011. "Do Conditional Cash Transfers for Schooling Generate Lasting Benefits?: A Five-Year Followup of PROGRESA/Oportunidades," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 46(1), pages 93-122.
- Cheolsung Park, 2003. "Are children repaying parental loans? Evidence from Malaysia using matched child-parent pairs," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 243-263, 05.
- Luc Arrondel & André Masson, 2002.
"Altruism, Exchange or Indirect Reciprocity: What do the Data on Family Transfers Show?,"
DELTA Working Papers
2002-18, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Arrondel, Luc & Masson, Andre, 2006. "Altruism, exchange or indirect reciprocity: what do the data on family transfers show?," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier.
- Luc Arrondel & André Masson, 2006. "Altruism, Exchange or Indirect Reciprocity: What Do the Data on Family Transfers Show?," Post-Print halshs-00754736, HAL.
- Gustavo J. Bobonis & Frederico Finan, 2009. "Neighborhood Peer Effects in Secondary School Enrollment Decisions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(4), pages 695-716, November.
- Raut, Lakshmi K. & Tran, Lien H., 2005. "Parental human capital investment and old-age transfers from children: Is it a loan contract or reciprocity for Indonesian families?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 389-414, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cie:wpaper:1201. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Diego Dominguez)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.