The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma
Becker derives the Rotten-Kid theorem -- that a child will not behave in a manner which lowers the parent's income more than it raises the child's -- in a one period setting. Not captured in Becker's analysis is that the family environment can exhibit what others refer to as the Samaritan's Dilemma. That is, children may consume too much in early periods because by doing so they can increase the income transfers they receive in later periods. In this paper we formally consider the Samaritan's Dilemma and its relation to the Rotten-Kid Theorem in a two period version of Becker's model.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Becker, Gary S, 1974.
"A Theory of Social Interactions,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-1093, Nov.-Dec..
- Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 151-182, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:402. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.