Incentives to cooperate and the discretionary power of courts in divorce law
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More about this item
KeywordsIncentives to cooperate in divorce; Bargaining in divorce litigation with risk averse parties; Rule versus discretion in the settlement of divorces; Scale of child support; K41–J12;
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