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Visitations and Transfers After Divorce

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  • Daniela Del Boca

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  • Rocio Ribero

    ()

Abstract

Recent research reveals that divorce negatively impacts children's welfare as a consequence of the reduction in monetary and time contributions of the non-custodial parent. After divorce, the variables that link the absent parent to the child are visitations, child support transfers, and direct expenditures the non-custodial parent makes on the child. In our framework parents constitute a bilateral exchange economy where the mother is endowed with control over visitations and the father has control over financial resources. We use data from National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (5th follow up) to estimate the parameters of the model. We then use the estimates to simulate the effects of alternative endowment levels (such as joint custody) on the proportion of time spent with the non-custodial parent and the ex post parental income distribution. The results indicate that an endowment of equal time for both parents, reducing time under the mother's control implies a reduction in the child support transfers from the father, and, therefore, a loss in the mother's consumption levels. However, a more equally shared time with the children also increases the father's direct expenditures on the child, with the effect of allowing the mother to spend less on child goods and partially compensate her consumption loss. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Daniela Del Boca & Rocio Ribero, 2003. "Visitations and Transfers After Divorce," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 187-204, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:reveho:v:1:y:2003:i:3:p:187-204
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1025045416999
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1025045416999
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Greg Duncan & Saul Hoffman, 1985. "A reconsideration of the economic consequences of marital dissolution," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 22(4), pages 485-497, November.
    2. Welling, Linda & Bearance, Marci, 2002. "Who's minding the kids? An economic comparison of sole and joint custody," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 15-29.
    3. Robert Haveman & Barbara Wolfe, 1995. "The Determinants of Children's Attainments: A Review of Methods and Findings," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(4), pages 1829-1878, December.
    4. Rocio Ribero & Daniela Del Boca, 2001. "The Effect of Child-Support Policies on Visitations and Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 130-134, May.
    5. Weiss, Yoram & Willis, Robert J, 1993. "Transfers among Divorced Couples: Evidence and Interpretation," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(4), pages 629-679, October.
    6. Del Boca, Daniela & Flinn, Christopher J., 1990. "The Effect Of Child Custody And Support Arrangements On The Welfare Of Children And Parents," Working Papers 90-16, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    7. Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn, 1994. "Expenditure Decisions of Divorced Mothers and Income Composition," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 29(3), pages 742-761.
    8. Weiss, Yoram & Willis, Robert J, 1985. "Children as Collective Goods and Divorce Settlements," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(3), pages 268-292, July.
    9. Del Boca, Daniela & Ribero, Rocio, 1998. "Transfers in non-intact households," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 469-478, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Deborah Cobb-Clark & Erdal Tekin, 2014. "Fathers and youths’ delinquent behavior," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 327-358, June.
    2. Martin Halla, 2005. "Unterhalt, Obsorge und Scheidungsanwälte: Eine ökonometrische Untersuchung der einvernehmlichen Scheidung in Österreich," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 141(IV), pages 501-525, December.
    3. John Ermisch, 2008. "Child support and non-resident fathers’ contact with their children," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 21(4), pages 827-853, October.
    4. Daniela Del Boca, 2003. "Mothers, fathers and children after divorce: The role of institutions," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 16(3), pages 399-422, August.
    5. repec:kap:reveho:v:16:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11150-016-9330-4 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Maya Rossin-Slater & Miriam Wüst, 2016. "Parental Responses to Child Support Obligations: Evidence from Administrative Data," NBER Working Papers 22227, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2006. "Incentives to cooperate and the discretionary power of courts in divorce law," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 423-439, December.
    8. Melissa Tartari, 2006. "Divorce and the cognitive achievement of children," 2006 Meeting Papers 32, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Jean-Claude Ray, 2014. "Child support order: how do judges decide without guidelines? Evidence from France," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 431-452, December.

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    Keywords

    divorce; visitations; child support transfers;

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