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The Law and Economics of Marriage Contracts

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  • Ian Smith

Abstract

Growth in property ownership has raised the stakes in the distribution of financial assets on divorce. Given high risks of marital failure, this has stimulated the demand for private ordering through enforceable marriage contracts. This paper surveys the existing law and economics literature and legal practice to consider the state of knowledge on the economic theory, scope and limits of written nuptial agreements.

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  • Ian Smith, 2003. "The Law and Economics of Marriage Contracts," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(2), pages 201-226, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:17:y:2003:i:2:p:201-226
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-6419.00193
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    Cited by:

    1. Rainer, Helmut, 2007. "Should we write prenuptial contracts?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 337-363, February.
    2. Wolfgang Frimmel & Martin Halla & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 2016. "How Does Parental Divorce Affect Children's Long-term Outcomes?," Working Papers 2016-13, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    3. Rainer, Helmut, 2007. "Should we write prenuptial contracts?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 337-363, February.
    4. Carole Bonnet & Bertrand Garbinti & Anne Solaz, 2021. "The flip side of marital specialization: the gendered effect of divorce on living standards and labor supply," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 34(2), pages 515-573, April.
    5. Ana Paula Martins, 2012. "Calls and Couples: Communication, Connections, Joint-Consumption and Transfer Prices," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 13(2), pages 237-281, November.
    6. Tümer Kapan, 2010. "Property Division Laws: The Effects on Labor Supply and Household Bargaining," 2010 Meeting Papers 1127, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Nicolas Frémeaux & Marion Leturcq, 2013. "Plus ou moins mariés : l'évolution du mariage et des régimes matrimoniaux en France," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 462(1), pages 125-151.
    8. John Douglas Skåtun, 2017. "Bargaining on your Spouse: Coasean and Non-Coasean Behaviour Within Marriage," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 263-278, June.
    9. Rayan G. Haykal, 2014. "Accepability of Civil Marriage in a Multidenominational Society: Results of an Empirical Survey in Lebanon," Working Papers 861, Economic Research Forum, revised Nov 2014.

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