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The Law and Economics of Marriage Contracts

  • Ian Smith

    (University of St Andrews)

Growth in property ownership has raised the stakes in the distribution of financial assets on divorce. Given high risks of marital failure, this has stimulated the demand for private ordering through enforceable marriage contracts. This paper surveys the existing law and economics literature and legal practice to consider the state of knowledge on the economic theory, scope and limits of written nuptial agreements. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2003.

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Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economic Surveys.

Volume (Year): 17 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 201-226

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:17:y:2003:i:2:p:201-226
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