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Marriage and Divorce in a Model of Matching

Author

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  • Mumcu, Ayse
  • Saglam, Ismail

Abstract

We study the problem of marriage formation and marital distribution in a two-period model of matching, extending the matching with bargaining framework of Crawford and Rochford (1986). We run simulations to find the effects of alimony rate, legal cost of divorce, initial endowments, couple and single productivity parameters on the payoffs and marital status in the society.

Suggested Citation

  • Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2006. "Marriage and Divorce in a Model of Matching," MPRA Paper 1907, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1907
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1907/1/MPRA_paper_1907.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1986. "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 437-454, June.
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    8. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 2007. "Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving Forces," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 27-52, Spring.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; bargaining; marriage; divorce;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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