What's the Use of Marriage?
We use elementary game-theoretical concepts to compare domestic equilibria with and without marriage. In particular, we examine the effects of marriage legislation, matrimonial property regime, and divorce court sentencing practice, on the decision to marry, and on the choice of game conditional on marriage. We find that, in the absence of social stigma or legal discrimination against unmarried couples, a couple will marry only if marriage serves as a commitment device which facilitates cooperation.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as 'Marriage as a commitment device' in: Review of Economics of the Household, 2012, 10 (2), 171-192|
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