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United but (un)equal: human capital, probability of divorce, and the marriage contract

Author

Listed:
  • CREMER, Helmuth
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre
  • ROEDER, Kerstin

Abstract

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting where complete specialization is optimal with no divorce risk. Couples can self-insure through savings which offers some protection to the uneducated spouse, but at the expense of a distortion. Alternatively, for large divorce probabilities, symmetry in education, where both spouses receive an equal amount of education, may be optimal. This eliminates the risk associated with the lack of education, but reduces the efficiency of education choices. We show that the symmetric allocation will become more attractive as the probability of divorce increases, if risk aversion is high and/or labor supply elasticity is low. However, it is only a "second-best" solution as insurance protection is achieved at the expense of an efficiency loss. Finally, we study how the (economic) use of marriage is affected by the possibility of divorce.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre & ROEDER, Kerstin, 2015. "United but (un)equal: human capital, probability of divorce, and the marriage contract," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2635, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2635
    Note: In : Journal of Population Economics, 28(1), 195-217, 2015
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew Grant & Steve Satchell, 2019. "Endogenous divorce risk and investment," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 32(3), pages 845-876, July.
    2. Togzhan Bakhtybaevna Zhunussova, 2022. "Influence of Legal Traditions and Legal Culture on the Institution of Marriage Contracts and the Possibility of its Improvement: The Experience of Kazakhstan," Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Richtmann Publishing Ltd, vol. 11, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law

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