The value of remarriage
Until 2004, divorce in Chile was illegal and separated women, representing 12% of all married women, were unable to remarry. This paper examines how the option of exiting the relationship and remarrying has changed the bargaining power in married and separated households. Using longitudinal survey data, we first document the effects of the reform on couples formation and separation, and on the labor force participation and labor supply decisions of married, separated, cohabiting and single women. We then use this variation in the data to structurally estimate a dynamic collective model of marriage, remarriage and household labor force participation and estimate the welfare impacts of the reform on men and women.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
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