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Marriage Market, Parents' Bargaining Powers, and Children's Nutrition and Education

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  • Cheolsung Park

Abstract

Test of resource pooling and test of effect of sex ratio in the marriage market on intrahousehold resource allocation are combined to test the unitary household model. The consistency condition between the two tests is derived to test the Nash household bargaining and Pareto-efficient household models. I examine intrahousehold resource allocation to children's nutrition and education in Indonesia. For children's nutrition, the unitary household model is rejected in favour of the non-unitary models. The results for investment in education are mixed. The decision-making process may differ depending on the type of decision being made. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Cheolsung Park, 2007. "Marriage Market, Parents' Bargaining Powers, and Children's Nutrition and Education," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 69(6), pages 773-793, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:obuest:v:69:y:2007:i:6:p:773-793
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    Cited by:

    1. Kimhi, Ayal, 2011. "Can Female Non-Farm Labor Income Reduce Income Inequality? Evidence from Rural Southern Ethiopia," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 114756, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Katsushi S. Imai & Samuel Kobina Annim & Raghav Gaiha & Veena S. Kulkarni, 2012. "Does Women's Empowerment Reduce Prevalence of Stunted and Underweight Children in Rural India?," Discussion Paper Series DP2012-11, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, revised Dec 2012.
    3. Jaime Andres Sarmiento Espinel & Edwin van Gameren, 2016. "A collective household labor supply model with children and non-participation: Theory and empirical application," Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos 2016-11, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos.
    4. Cheolsung Park, 2014. "Why do children transfer to their parents? Evidence from South Korea," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 461-485, September.
    5. Imai, Katsushi S. & Annim, Samuel Kobina & Kulkarni, Veena S. & Gaiha, Raghav, 2014. "Women’s Empowerment and Prevalence of Stunted and Underweight Children in Rural India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 88-105.
    6. Jungho Kim & Henriette Engelhardt-Wölfler & Alexia Fürnkranz-Prskawetz & Arnstein Aassve, 2009. "Does fertility decrease household consumption?," Demographic Research, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany, vol. 20(26), pages 623-656, June.
    7. Jaime Andrés Sarmiento Espinel, 2012. "Parental investment in their children’s education," Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos 2012-09, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos.
    8. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Madina Agénor, 2014. "Infrastructure, women’s time allocation, and economic development," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(1), pages 1-30, September.
    9. Agénor, Pierre-Richard & Canuto, Otaviano & da Silva, Luiz Pereira, 2014. "On gender and growth: The role of intergenerational health externalities and women's occupational constraints," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 132-147.
    10. Delprato, Marcos & Akyeampong, Kwame & Dunne, Máiréad, 2017. "Intergenerational Education Effects of Early Marriage in Sub-Saharan Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 173-192.
    11. repec:emx:esteco:v:33:y:2018:i:1:p:65-115 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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