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Individual decisions and household demand for consumption and leisure

Listed author(s):
  • Chiuri, Maria Concetta

The standard microeconomic assumption of a household utility function raises two theoretical problems: it contradicts methodological individualism and it ignores economic phenomena like income and consumption sharing, division of labour, externalities and altruism within a household. This paper reviews two approaches, aggregation theory and more recent non-unitary models, to compare the different properties that household consumption and leisure demands have to satisfy in the two basic contexts. The paper also discusses some recent empirical evidence which seems to encourage further investigation in the non-unitary framework.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.

Volume (Year): 54 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 277-324

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Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:54:y:2000:i:3:p:277-324
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622941

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