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Approches pluri-décisionnelles de la famille

Listed author(s):
  • Nicolas Moreau

[fre] Dans ce texte nous étudions les applications empiriques des approches pluri-décisionnelles de la famille que sont les modèles non coopératifs, collectifs et de négociation. Pour chaque approche nous rappelons le cadre théorique et présentons les principales applications empiriques. Seule l'approche collective fournit des restrictions paramétriques tes- tables. Celles-ci n'ont pas été rejetées par les données. [eng] This paper discusses issues on the empirical implementation of intrahousehold decision making models. These are bargaining, collective and non cooperative models. For each framework we briefly recall and discuss the theory and present the main applied works. We also supply a table which is a recapitulation of all estimations we present. Among the three frameworks, the collective approach is the only one to supply falsifiable restrictions. These are not rejected by the data.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/rfeco.2001.1505
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File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/rfeco_0769-0479_2001_num_15_4_1505
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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

Volume (Year): 15 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 145-185

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2001_num_15_4_1505
Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2001.1505
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/rfeco

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  1. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 1995. "Economics in a Family Way," Labor and Demography 9507002, EconWPA, revised 06 Feb 1996.
  2. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  3. Kooreman, P. & Kapteyn, A.J., 1989. "On the empirical implementation of some game theoretic models of household labor supply," Discussion Paper 1989-56, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Richard Blundell & Pierre-André Chiappori & Thierry Magnac & Costas Meghir, 1998. "Collective labour supply: heterogeneity and non-participation," IFS Working Papers W98/20, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  5. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  6. Martin Browning & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 1994. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: a General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Department of Economics Working Papers 1994-02, McMaster University.
  7. Chiappori, P.A., 1989. "Collective Labour Supply and Welfare," DELTA Working Papers 89-07, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  8. repec:uwp:jhriss:v:3:y:1968:i:3:p:312-323 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Udry, Christopher, 1996. "Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 1010-1046, October.
  10. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
  11. Doss, Cheryl R., 1996. "Women'S Bargaining Power In Household Economic Decisions: Evidence From Ghana," Staff Papers 13517, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
  12. Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 1997. "A Test of the Unitary and Collective Models of Household Labour Supply," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 933-955, July.
  13. T. Paul Schultz, 1990. "Testing the Neoclassical Model of Family Labor Supply and Fertility," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 599-634.
  14. François Bourguignon, 1984. "Rationalité individuelle ou rationalité stratégique : le cas de l'offre familiale de travail," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 35(1), pages 147-162.
  15. Christine Jones, 1983. "The Mobilization of Women's Labor for Cash Crop Production: A Game Theoretic Approach," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 65(5), pages 1049-1054.
  16. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
  17. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1990. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Reply," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 237-242, February.
  18. Pollak, Robert A, 1977. "Price Dependent Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 64-75, March.
  19. Apps, Patricia F & Rees, Ray, 1997. "Collective Labor Supply and Household Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 178-190, February.
  20. Becker, Gary S, 1993. "Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 385-409, June.
  21. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 1998. "Household Labor Supply, Sharing Rule and the Marriage Market," Cahiers de recherche 9810, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  22. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
  23. Moreau, N., 1999. "Modeles non cooperatifs, de negociation et collectifs: trois approches pluri-decisionnelles de la famille en economie," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 99c11, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
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