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Approches pluri-décisionnelles de la famille

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  • Nicolas Moreau

Abstract

[fre] Dans ce texte nous étudions les applications empiriques des approches pluri-décisionnelles de la famille que sont les modèles non coopératifs, collectifs et de négociation. Pour chaque approche nous rappelons le cadre théorique et présentons les principales applications empiriques. Seule l'approche collective fournit des restrictions paramétriques tes- tables. Celles-ci n'ont pas été rejetées par les données. [eng] This paper discusses issues on the empirical implementation of intrahousehold decision making models. These are bargaining, collective and non cooperative models. For each framework we briefly recall and discuss the theory and present the main applied works. We also supply a table which is a recapitulation of all estimations we present. Among the three frameworks, the collective approach is the only one to supply falsifiable restrictions. These are not rejected by the data.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Moreau, 2001. "Approches pluri-décisionnelles de la famille," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 15(4), pages 145-185.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2001_num_15_4_1505
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2001.1505
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Keita, Moussa, 2011. "Influence de la négociation intra-ménage sur les dépenses d’éducation dans les ménages au Mali
      [Influence of intra-household bargaining on education expenditures in households in Mali]
      ," MPRA Paper 57592, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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