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Approches pluri-décisionnelles de la famille

  • Nicolas Moreau

[fre] Dans ce texte nous étudions les applications empiriques des approches pluri-décisionnelles de la famille que sont les modèles non coopératifs, collectifs et de négociation. Pour chaque approche nous rappelons le cadre théorique et présentons les principales applications empiriques. Seule l'approche collective fournit des restrictions paramétriques tes- tables. Celles-ci n'ont pas été rejetées par les données. [eng] This paper discusses issues on the empirical implementation of intrahousehold decision making models. These are bargaining, collective and non cooperative models. For each framework we briefly recall and discuss the theory and present the main applied works. We also supply a table which is a recapitulation of all estimations we present. Among the three frameworks, the collective approach is the only one to supply falsifiable restrictions. These are not rejected by the data.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

Volume (Year): 15 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 145-185

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2001_num_15_4_1505
Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2001.1505
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  1. Apps, P.F. & Rees, R., 1996. "Collective Labor Supply and Household Production," Papers 301, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
  2. Richard Blundell & Pierre-André Chiappori & Thierry Magnac & Costas Meghir, 2001. "Collective Labor Supply : Heterogeneity and Nonparticipation," Working Papers 2001-32, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  3. Doss, Cheryl R., 1996. "Women'S Bargaining Power In Household Economic Decisions: Evidence From Ghana," Staff Papers 13517, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
  4. M. Browning & P. A. Chiappori, 1998. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1241-1278, November.
  5. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Working Papers 91-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  6. Schultz, T.P., 1990. "Testing The Neoclassical Model Of Family Labor Supply And Fertility," Papers 601, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  7. Ted Bergstrom, 1995. "Economic in a Family Way," Papers _028, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
  8. Kooreman, P. & Kapteyn, A.J., 1989. "On the empirical implementation of some game theoretic models of household labor supply," Discussion Paper 1989-56, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. Pollak, Robert A, 1977. "Price Dependent Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 64-75, March.
  10. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1990. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Reply," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 237-42, February.
  11. Becker, Gary S, 1993. "Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 385-409, June.
  12. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 1998. "Household Labor Supply, Sharing Rule and the Marriage Market," Cahiers de recherche 9810, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  13. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May.
  14. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
  15. Udry, Christopher, 1996. "Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 1010-46, October.
  16. Christine Jones, 1983. "The Mobilization of Women's Labor for Cash Crop Production: A Game Theoretic Approach," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 65(5), pages 1049-1054.
  17. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
  18. Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 1997. "A Test of the Unitary and Collective Models of Household Labour Supply," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 933-55, July.
  19. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  20. Bergstrom, T., 1995. "Economics of a Family Way," Papers 95-07, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  21. Moreau, N., 1999. "Modeles non cooperatifs, de negociation et collectifs: trois approches pluri-decisionnelles de la famille en economie," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 99c11, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  22. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-67, June.
  23. François Bourguignon, 1984. "Rationalité individuelle ou rationalité stratégique : le cas de l'offre familiale de travail," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 35(1), pages 147-162.
  24. Jane H. Leuthold, 1968. "An Empirical Study of Formula Income Transfers and the Work Decision of the Poor," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 3(3), pages 312-323.
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