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Individual Decisions and Household Demand for Consumption And Leisure

  • Maria Concetta Chiuri

    ()

    (University of Bari and CSEF, University of Salerno)

The standard microeconomic assumption of a household utility function raises two theoretical problems: it contradicts methodological individualism and it ignores economic phenomena like income and consumption sharing, division of labour, externalities and altruism within a household. This paper reviews two approaches, aggregation theory and more recent non-unitary models, to compare the different properties that household consumption and leisure demands have to satisfy in the two basic contexts. The paper also discusses some recent empirical evidence which seems to encourage further investigation in the non-unitary framework.

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Paper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 26.

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Date of creation: 01 Oct 1999
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Publication status: Published in Research in Economics, 2000, vol. 54, pages 277-324
Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:26
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