Household Labor Supply, Sharing Rule and the Marriage Market
In this paper we estimate a model of household labor supply based on the collective approach developed by Chiappori (JPE, 1992). This approach assumes that the intra-household decision process leads to Pareto efficient outcomes. Our model extends this theory by allowing the marriage market, and especially the sex ratio, to affect the sharing rule and the household labor supplies. We show that our model imposes new restrictions on the parameters of the labor supply functions. Also, individual preferences and the sharing rule are recovered using an identification procedure that is both simpler and more robust than in Chiappori's initial approach. The model is estimated using PSID data for the year 1988. Our results do not reject the restrictions imposed by the model. Moreover, the sex ratio influences the sharing rule and the labor supply behavior in the directions predicted by the theory. Finally, the impact of individual wage rates suggests that spouses behave in an altruistic manner within the household.
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