Rationalité individuelle ou rationalité stratégique : le cas de l'offre familiale de travail
[fre] Cet article analyse le statut des conditions de Slutsky dans le test de la rationalité des décisions d'offre de travail d'un ménage à deux membres. Il y est montré que ces conditions peuvent être satisfaites dans un modèle stratégique, fondamentalement différent de la maximisation d'une utilité collective, et que, inversement, elles ne sont pas toujours satisfaites, empiriquement, sous cette dernière hypothèse qui peut, dans ces conditions, être à considérer comme un postulat. [eng] Individual or strategic rationality : The case of family labor supply François Bourguignon This paper explores the status of Slutsky conditions for testing the rationality of labor-supply decision-making in a two-members household. It is shown that those conditions may hold in a game-theoretic model, fundamentally distinct from the collective utility maximization assumption, and that, conversely, they may not be empirically satisfied under the latter assumption, which might thus be considered as a postulate.
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Volume (Year): 35 (1984)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Bliss, Christopher & Stern, Nicholas, 1978. "Productivity, wages and nutrition : Part I: the theory," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 331-362, December.
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
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