Estimation of Econometric Models of Some Discrete Games
This paper discusses, estimates and compares some microeconometric models for simultaneous discrete endogenous variables. The models are based on the assumption that observed endogenous variables represent the outcome of a static discrete game. I discuss models based on non-cooperative equilibrium concepts (Nash, Stackelberg), as well as models which presume Pareto optimality of observed outcomes. The models are estimated using data on the joint labor force participation decisions of husbands and wives in a sample of Dutch households. Copyright 1994 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Volume (Year): 9 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (July-Sept.)
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