Are Better Off Households More Unequal or Less Unequal?
The object of this paper is to investigate the implications of intrahousehold bargaining models for the behavior of intrahousehold inequality as a function of total household resources. The authors find theoretical support for Kuznets effects, i.e., a systematic pattern of inequality change as the total household resources increase. The paper also discusses some policy implications of this relationship. In particular, the authors find that bargaining models tend to lead to a greater emphasis on targeting to disadvantaged members of a household. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.
Volume (Year): 46 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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- Haddad, L. & Kanbur, R., 1989.
"How Serious Is The Neglectof Intra-Household Inequality?,"
450, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Haddad, Lawrence & Kanbur, Ravi, 1990. "How Serious Is the Neglect of Intra-Household Inequality?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(402), pages 866-81, September.
- Haddad, Lawrence & Kanbur, Ravi, 1989. "How serious is the neglect of intrahousehold inequality ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 296, The World Bank.
- Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
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