Scelte di consumo e modello collettivo: test della razionalità collettiva e stima della regola di ripartizione con i dati italiani
In this paper we estimate a model of household consumption based on the collective approach developed by Chiappori. We test the collective rationality hypothesis and the respective bargaining power in the family i.e. whether the individual wage of each spou-se influences the sharing rule. The model is estimated using Ita-lian data from the Consumption Survey conducted by Istat in 1999.
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Volume (Year): 94 (2004)
Issue (Month): 5 (September-October)
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