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Report NEP-GTH-2009-10-17
This is the archive for NEP-GTH, a report on new working papers in the area of Game Theory. Sylvain Béal (Sylvain Beal) issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-GTH
The following items were announced in this report:
- Rieger, Marc Oliver, 2015, "Evolutionary stability of prospect theory preferences," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, number 422, Dec.
- Sailesh Gunessee, 2009, "Strategic Tax Competition: An Experimental Study," ICBBR Working Papers, International Centre for Behavioural Business Research, number 5, Oct.
- Chen-Zhong Qin & Lloyd S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, 2009, "Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1729, Sep.
- Andaluz, Joaquín & Marcén, Miriam & Molina, José Alberto, 2009, "Dynamics of intrahousehold bargaining," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 17742, Oct.
- Ralph-C. Bayer & Elke Renner & Rupert Sausgruber, 2009, "Confusion and Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Public Goods Games," Working Papers, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck, number 2009-22, Sep.
- Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009, "Equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies," Working Papers, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales, number 2009-12, Oct.
- Bergantiños, Gustavo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2009, "The folk solution and Boruvka's algorithm in minimum cost spanning tree problems," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 17839, Oct.
- Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2009, "Default Penalty as a Disciplinary and Selection Mechanism in Presence of Multiple Equilibria," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1730, Oct.