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Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments

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Abstract

A link between a no-side-payment (NSP) market game and a side-payment (SP) market game can be established by introducing a sufficient amount of an ideal utility-money of constant marginal utility to all agents. At some point when there is "enough money" in the system, if it is "well distributed" the new game will be a SP game. This game can also be related to a pure NSP game where a set of default parameters have been introduced. These parameters play a role similar to the parameters specifying the interpersonal comparisons in the side-payment game. We study this game for the properties of the delta-core and consider both the conditions for the uniqueness of competitive equilibria and a new approach to the second welfare theorem. A discussion of the relationship between market games and strategic market games is also noted.

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  • Chen-Zhong Qin & Lloyd S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, 2009. "Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1729, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1729
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin Shubik, 2000. "The Theory of Money," Working Papers 00-03-021, Santa Fe Institute.
    2. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "An Example of a Trading Economy with Three Competitive Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(4), pages 873-875, August.
    3. Scarf, Herbert E., 1971. "On the existence of a coopertive solution for a general class of N-person games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 169-181, June.
    4. Shubik, Martin, 1971. "Pecuniary Externalities: A Game Theoretic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 713-718, September.
    5. Per Bak & Simon F. Norrelykke & Martin Shubik, 1998. "The Dynamics of Money," Research in Economics 98-11-102e, Santa Fe Institute.
    6. Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shimomura, Ken-Ichi, 2006. "The Walras core of an economy and its limit theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 180-197, April.
    7. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
    8. Gerard Debreu, 1963. "On a Theorem of Scarf," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 30(3), pages 177-180.
    9. Martin Shubik, 2004. "The Edgeworth, Cournot and Walrasian Cores," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm433, Yale School of Management.
    10. Cheng-Zhong Qin & Martin Shubik, 2005. "A Credit Mechanism for Selecting a Unique Competitive Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1539R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2009.
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    Cited by:

    1. Odd Godal & Bjart Holtsmark, 2010. "International emissions trading with endogenous taxes," Discussion Papers 626, Statistics Norway, Research Department.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    delta-core; enough money; market games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates

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