Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments
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More about this item
Keywords
delta-core; enough money; market games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2009-10-17 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2009-10-17 (Microeconomics)
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