A Credit Mechanism for Selecting a Unique Competitive Equilibrium
The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow default subject to penalties to appririate credit limits and default penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for a credit using society. We show that there generically exists a price-normalizing bundle that determines a credit money along with appropriate credit limits and default penalties for a credit mechanism to select a unique competitive equilibrium (CE). With some additional conditions, a common credit money can be applied such that any CE can be a unique selection by the credit mechanism with appropriate credit limits default penalties for the traders. This will include a CE with the minimal cash flow penalty. Such CEs are special for the reason that we minimize the need for a substitute-for-trust (i.e. money) in trade.
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| Length: | 21 pages |
| Date of creation: | Oct 2005 |
| Date of revision: | Jun 2009 |
| Handle: | RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1539r |
| Contact details of provider: | Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA Phone: (203) 432-3702 Fax: (203) 432-6167 Web page: http://cowles.yale.edu/ More information through EDIRC
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| Order Information: | Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin Shubik, 2000.
"The Theory of Money,"
Working Papers
00-03-021, Santa Fe Institute.
- Martin Shubik, 2000. "The Theory of Money," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1253, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "An Example of a Trading Economy with Three Competitive Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(4), pages 873-875, August.
- Billera, Louis J., 1974. "On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 129-139, August. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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