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A Credit Mechanism for Selecting a Unique Competitive Equilibrium

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Abstract

The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow default subject to penalties to appririate credit limits and default penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for a credit using society. We show that there generically exists a price-normalizing bundle that determines a credit money along with appropriate credit limits and default penalties for a credit mechanism to select a unique competitive equilibrium (CE). With some additional conditions, a common credit money can be applied such that any CE can be a unique selection by the credit mechanism with appropriate credit limits default penalties for the traders. This will include a CE with the minimal cash flow penalty. Such CEs are special for the reason that we minimize the need for a substitute-for-trust (i.e. money) in trade.

Suggested Citation

  • Cheng-Zhong Qin & Martin Shubik, 2005. "A Credit Mechanism for Selecting a Unique Competitive Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1539R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2009.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1539r
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    1. Martin Shubik, 2000. "The Theory of Money," Working Papers 00-03-021, Santa Fe Institute.
    2. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "An Example of a Trading Economy with Three Competitive Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(4), pages 873-875, August.
    3. Billera, Louis J., 1974. "On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 129-139, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2009. "Default Penalty as a Disciplinary and Selection Mechanism in Presence of Multiple Equilibria," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1730, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Chen-Zhong Qin & Lloyd S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, 2009. "Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1729, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competitive equilibrium; Credit mechanism; Marginal utility of income; Welfare economics;

    JEL classification:

    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates

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