Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs
We establish a link between cooperative and competitive behavior. For every possible vector of weights of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists a market that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive payoff vector.
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- Cheng-Zhong Qin & Martin Shubik, 2012.
"Selecting a unique competitive equilibrium with default penalties,"
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