Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs
We establish a link between cooperative and competitive behavior. For every possible vector of weights of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists a market that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive payoff vector.
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References listed on IDEAS
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