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Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs

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  • Brangewitz, Sonja
  • Gamp, Jan-Philip

Abstract

We establish a link between cooperative and competitive behavior. For every possible vector of weights of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists a market that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive payoff vector.

Suggested Citation

  • Brangewitz, Sonja & Gamp, Jan-Philip, 2013. "Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 224-227.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:2:p:224-227 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Walter Trockel, 2005. "Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(1), pages 255-263, January.
    2. Cheng-Zhong Qin & Martin Shubik, 2012. "Selecting a unique competitive equilibrium with default penalties," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(2), pages 119-132, June.
    3. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "A Walrasian approach to bargaining games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 295-301, June.
    4. Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1993. "A Conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of NTU Market Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(4), pages 335-344.
    5. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1593-1623, September.
    6. Billera, Louis J., 1974. "On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 129-139, August.
    7. Qin Cheng-Zhong, 1994. "The Inner Core of an n-Person Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 431-444, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions; Competitive payoffs; Market games; Inner core;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

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