Representation of transferable utility games by coalition production economies
We prove that, by the method of construction of a coalition production economy due to Sun et al. [Sun, N., Trockel, W., Yang, Z., 2008. Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game. Journal of Mathematical Economics 44, 853–860], every transferable utility (TU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. Namely, for every TU game, we can construct a coalition production economy that generates the given game. We briefly discuss the relationship between the core of a given TU game and the set of Walrasian payoff vectors for the induced coalition production economy.
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