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The Present and Future of Game Theory

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  • Martin Shubik

Abstract

A broad nontechnical coverage of many of the developments in game theory since the 1950s is given together with some comments on important open problems and where some of the developments may take place. The nearly 90 references given serve only as a minimal guide to the many thousands of books and articles that have been written. The purpose here is to present a broad brush picture of the many areas of study and application that have come into being. The use of deep techniques flourishes best when it stays in touch with application. There is a vital symbiotic relationship between good theory and practice. The breakneck speed of development of game theory calls for an appreciation of both the many realities of conflict, coordination and cooperation and the abstract investigation of all of them.
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  • Martin Shubik, 2011. "The Present and Future of Game Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000173, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000173
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. Huber, Juergen & Shubik, Martin & Sunder, Shyam, 2007. "Everyone-a-Banker or the Ideal Credit Acceptance Everyone-a-Banker or the Ideal Credit Acceptance," Working Papers 26, Yale University, Department of Economics.
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    18. Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, 1996. "Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262550253, December.
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    20. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
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    23. Gerard Debreu, 1963. "On a Theorem of Scarf," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 30(3), pages 177-180.
    24. Ioannis Karatzas & Martin Shubik & William D. Sudderth, 1992. "Construction of Stationary Markov Equilibria in a Strategic Market Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1033, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    25. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    26. Martin Shubik, 1962. "Some Experimental Non-Zero Sum Games with Lack of Information About the Rules," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(2), pages 215-234, January.
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    28. Jerome Bracken & Martin Shubik, 1993. "Worldwide Nuclear Coalition Games: A Valuation of Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(4), pages 655-668, August.
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    2. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Yoshitaka Okano & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2015. "The approval mechanism solves the prisoner's dilemma theoretically and experimentally," Working Papers SDES-2015-12, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2015.
    3. Olkhov, Victor, 2022. "Economic Policy - the Forth Dimension of the Economic Theory," MPRA Paper 112685, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Victor Olkhov, 2021. "Theoretical Economics and the Second-Order Economic Theory. What is it?," Papers 2112.04566, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    5. Victor Olkhov, 2017. "Econophysics Macroeconomic Model," Papers 1701.06625, arXiv.org.
    6. Victor Olkhov, 2022. "Why Economic Theories and Policies Fail? Unnoticed Variables and Overlooked Economics," Papers 2208.07839, arXiv.org.
    7. Iraklis Kollias & John Leventides & Vassilios G. Papavassiliou, 2022. "On the solution of games with arbitrary payoffs: An application to an over-the-counter financial market," Working Papers 202302, Geary Institute, University College Dublin.

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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

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