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The Present and Future of Game Theory

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  • Martin Shubik

Abstract

A broad nontechnical coverage of many of the developments in game theory since the 1950s is given together with some comments on important open problems and where some of the developments may take place. The nearly 90 references given serve only as a minimal guide to the many thousands of books and articles that have been written. The purpose here is to present a broad brush picture of the many areas of study and application that have come into being. The use of deep techniques flourishes best when it stays in touch with application. There is a vital symbiotic relationship between good theory and practice. The breakneck speed of development of game theory calls for an appreciation of both the many realities of conflict, coordination and cooperation and the abstract investigation of all of them.
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Suggested Citation

  • Martin Shubik, 2011. "The Present and Future of Game Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000173, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000173
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2000. "Economics and Language," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number lang1.
    2. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    3. Leonid Hurwicz, 2008. "But Who Will Guard the Guardians?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 577-585, June.
    4. Gilboa, Itzhak & Zemel, Eitan, 1989. "Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 80-93, March.
    5. Friedman, James, 1993. "Oligopoly theory," Handbook of Mathematical Economics,in: K. J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 4, volume 2, chapter 11, pages 491-534 Elsevier.
    6. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, April.
    7. Dubey, Pradeep, 1982. "Price-Quantity Strategic Market Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 111-126, January.
    8. Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882, April.
    9. Ioannis Karatzas & Martin Shubik & William D. Sudderth, 1992. "Construction of Stationary Markov Equilibria in a Strategic Market Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1033, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    10. Eric S. Maskin, 2008. "Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 567-576, June.
    11. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2003. "A computer scientist looks at game theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 114-131, October.
    12. Martin Shubik, 2000. "The Theory of Money," Working Papers 00-03-021, Santa Fe Institute.
    13. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-968, October.
    14. Martin Shubik, 1962. "Some Experimental Non-Zero Sum Games with Lack of Information About the Rules," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(2), pages 215-234, January.
    15. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    16. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
    17. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    18. Dubey, P. & Rogawski, J. D., 1990. "Inefficiency of smooth market mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 285-304.
    19. Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2007. "Eeryone-a-banker or the Ideal Credit Acceptance Game: Theory and Evidence," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001397, UCLA Department of Economics.
    20. Martin Shubik, 1962. "Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(3), pages 325-343, April.
    21. repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. S.C. Littlechild & G.F. Thompson, 1977. "Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 186-204, Spring.
    23. Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, 1996. "Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262550253, January.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

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