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Retrading in market games

  • Ghosal, Sayantan
  • Morelli, Massimo

When agents are not price takers, they typically cannot obtain an efficient reallocation of resources in one round of trade. This paper presents a noncooperative model of imperfect competition where agents can retrade allocations,consistent with the Edgeworth’s idea of recontracting. We show that there are allocations on the Pareto frontier that can be approximated arbitrarily closely when trade is myopic, i.e., when agents play a static Nash equilibrium at every round of retrading. We then show that the converging sequence of allocations generated by myopic retrading can also be supported along some retrade-proof Subgame Perfect Equilibrium path when traders anticipate future rounds of retrading.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 115 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 151-181

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:115:y:2004:i:1:p:151-181
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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